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THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP IN INDIANA
ROBERT C. BROWN*

The limited partnership is a business organization of a somewhat hybrid character. Strictly speaking, it is a mere partnership and is, therefore, not a legal entity. On the other hand it
resembles a corporation in that the liability of a part of the
persons concerned (not all, since there must always be at least
one general partner) may be limited.
It is hardly necessary to say that this is a scheme wholly unknown to the common law. It was, however, well developed in
the civil law and hence the idea was early taken advantage of in
American jurisdictions by statutory provisions. The first of these
statutes was adopted in New York in 1822 and since then practically all of the states have followed this example; although, curiously enough, England did not have any provision for limited
partnerships until 1908. Perhaps this delay was not an unmixed
evil since the English Act has avoided most of the defects which
appeared in the early American acts and is, therefore, a very
well drawn and workable statute.'
The state of Indiana was reasonably prompt in making provision for limited partnerships, the original act having been passed
in 1859.2 In 1903 an amendatory act 3 was passed which to some
slight degree liberalized the previous statute. These two acts
constitute the existing statutory regulation of the limited partnership in this state.
Despite the comparative antiquity of the authorization of limited partnerships in Indiana, they have been little used. There
* See p. 454 for biographical note.
1 See F. M. Burdick, Limited Partnership in England and America

(1908), 6 Mich. L. Rev. 523.
2 Burns' Annotated Indiana Statutes, 1926, Sees. 12141-12152.
3 Burns' Annotated Indiana Statutes, 1926, Secs. 12154-12159.
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are today comparatively few limited partnerships in the state,
and such has apparently always been the case. A rather striking
bit of evidence of the unimportance of limited partnerships in
the commercial life of Indiana is the fact that not once has the
Supreme Court or the Appellate Courts passed'upon any litigation respecting limited partnerships. The situation presented
here of a fairly elaborate commercial statute constantly in force
for seventy years, which has never once been before the courts
for construction or for any other purpose, is believed to be almost unique, and it certainly evidences a lack of interest in using
this statutory provision. Limited partnerships are not playing
the part in the commercial life of Indiana which they might play
and which the obvious business advantages of the device make it
desirable that they should play.
The reason for this is, however, not difficult to ascertain. As
already pointed out, the limited partnership is a device entirely
foreign to common law concepts, and even the legislatures that
were deliberately making provision for its use did so with great,
and in general with rather unfortunate, caution. This is the situation in Indiana where the existing statue, even with the twentieth century modifications, still represents substantially the original form of such statutes devised by legislatures whose primary
interest was to change the common law as little as possible, and
especially to protect creditors to the limit.
If legislatures were thus unduly hampered by common law
concepts it is hardly surprising that courts took the same point
of view-and usually much more so. In other words, the courts
by a liberal application of such unfortunate shibboleths as "statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed" 4 have tended to construe out of the statutes such slight
efficacy as the legislatures originally put into them. Of course,
we cannot definitely ascertain what the attitude of the Indiana
courts will be toward this statute, since, as already pointed out,
they have never had any occasion to construe it. However, there
is an abundance of Indiana authority with respect to ordinary
partnerships, and here the courts have been pretty rigid in their
construction of rules imposing liability on the partners.5 Accordingly it seems not unfair to infer that a like view would be
4 That this doctrine is wholly unsound is convincingly demonstrated by
Pound, Common Law and Legislation (1908), 21 Harv. L. Rev. 383.
5 See Manning v. Gasharie, 27 Ind. 399 (1866); Coleman v. Coleman, 78
Ind. 344 (1881).

LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS IN INDIANA

taken of the existing limited partnership statute and indeed it
seems that business men have already made this inference, as is
shown by their disinclination to make any use of the statute.
But, however this may be, the statute, as will presently appear,
is so rigid in its express language as to make it impossible for
the court to obtain results which could be otherwise than severe,
even if it desired so to do.
But the situation in Indiana was and is by no means unique.
Nearly all of the original limited partnership statutes imposed
rather severe liabilities upon persons who attempted to use them
-at any rate if these persons made the slightest mistake in their
procedure. It is true that in some jurisdictions, at least, a tendency has been apparent in the last few decades toward a more
liberal interpretation of the statute and in particular toward a
relief from liabilities from merely slight and inconsequential
deviations from the prescribed procedure.6 Yet the situation
was quite unsatisfactory, since business men still felt that the
protection which the statute was supposed to give to the limited
partners was unsatisfactory.
Recognizing that this was a situation demanding remedy in
most jurisdictions, the matter was considered by the commissioners on Uniform State Laws of the American Bar Association, and a proposed uniform act was drafted and submitted in
1916. Unlike many of the uniform acts, which were intended
merely to codify the existing law on the subject, this act was
avowedly remedial in character. It was intended to make limited
partnerships a useful, and in fact used, method of business organization, by removing the danger of unlimited liability which
was cast by the older statutes upon innocent persons believing
themselves to be special partners, as a result of the most minute
and inconsequential variations from the statutory procedure, not
6 The most conspicuous examples of this liberalising tendency are Manhattan Co. v. Lainbeer, 108 N. Y. 578, 15 N. E. 712 (1888), holding that a
special partner is not subjected to the liability of a general partner by

reason of the failure of a county clerk, to whom a certificate had been given
for recording, to actually record it; and Chick v. Robinson, 95 Fed. 619

(1899), holding that under the Michigan statute a payment by check of the
amount to be contributed is sufficient, even though the check is not collected
at once. Both of these opinions contain language advocating a liberal con-

struction of the limited partnership statutes, in the interest of a reasonably
adequate protection of the limited partners.

But there are many even

recent authorities which are contrary to these cases, both in the precise
decisions and in the spirit of construction.
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only by themselves but by their partners. The enactment of this
uniform statute therefore represents a definite change in policy
by those states which have adopted it and it would be a definite
change of policy by Indiana-a change which, however, seems
distinctly desirable.7
A brief analysis of the important provisions of the Indiana
statute will now be made, together with some consideration of
the changes which would be effected by the enactment of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act.
Limited partnerships are authorized in this state for any business except insurance.8 The question of what businesses if any
are to be forbidden to limited partnerships is one of policy and
is indeed left open in the Uniform Act. Accordingly, this prohibition might be continued even if Indiana should adopt the new
act. It is submitted, however, that the restriction is unfortunate.
Limited partnerships have a certain very narrow usefulness in
ordinary commercial business, particularly where an older man
desires to retire from active business in favor of his younger
partners (frequently sons), but where it is essential to the
proper carrying on of the business that he leave a substantial
amount of capital in it. However, the utility of limited partnerships in this sort of business is not very extensive; a corporation
is the more usual method. The most common use, and it is believed the greatest utility, of limited partnerships (where there
is no statute prohibiting) is in financial business-insurance,
brokerage and investment banking. Here limited partnerships
are often more desirable than corporations because of the unlimited liability of the general partners and the consequent greater
financial responsibility of the firm. To restrict limited partnerships from the very sort of business to which they are best
adapted, seems, therefore, quite unfortunate.
Next follows provisions 9 with respect to the composition of
the firm (at least one general and one special partner) and a
statement respecting the contributions to capital, which are
always required from each special partner. In Indiana, which
in this respect is somewhat more liberal than many states, this
7The Uniform Limited Partnership Act has been adopted in fourteen
states. For an excellent discussion of the provisions of the Act and the
purpose for which it was designed, see W. D. Lewis, The Uniform Limited
PartnershipAct (1917), 65 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 715.
8 Burns', Sec. 12141.

9 Burns', Sec. 12142.
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contribution may be made in goods as well as in cash.

The fre-

quent controversies which have arisen in some states as to what
constitutes payment in cash are thus avoided in this state.'0
However, it is required that where the contribution is not in cash
the certificate shall so state," and that the property contributed
be appraised by an appraiser appointed by the Circuit Court.
It would seem clear that such appraisal should be at only the net
value of the assets, deducting any incumbrances. 12 This pro'

vision for appraisals is not made in the Uniform Act. It seems
to be a safeguard not withou't a certain value, but the protection
thus obtained by creditors may perhaps hardly be considered to
be worth the expense and delay caused by this requirement.
Next follows the vital provisions with respect to the making,

filing and recording of the certificate. 13 This is the most important phase of the law, since the certificate is the only source of
information to the creditors of the existence of the limited partnership and the consequent absence of personal liability of the
special partners, as well as of the amount contributed by the
special partners. Accordingly it is held with practical unanimity
that any false statement in the certificate, or any failure to comply, with the utmost exactness, with the requirements of the
statutes as to the execution and recording of the certificate, subjects the special partners to the liability of general partners. 14
10 The most horrible example of such difficulties is Haggerty v. Foster,
103 Mass. 17 (1869), holding that a contribution of government bonds
though worth more than their face amount (and actually realizing more)
were not cash within the meaning of this requirement. A similar narrow
decision is Durant v. Abendroth, 69 N. Y. 148 (1877), practically holding
that a check is not cash for this purpose. White v. Eiseman, 134 N. Y. 101,
31 N. E. 276 (1892), and Chick v. Robinson, supra, note 6, take the opposite
view as to checks.
11 Compare, Holiday v. Union Bag and Paper Co., 3 Colo. 342 (1877).
12 First National Bank v. Creveling, 177 Pa. 270, 35 Atl. 595 (1896).
13 Burns', Secs. 12143-12145.
14 See the cases cited in notes 10 to 12; also Richardson v. Hogg, 38 Pa.
153 (1861); Van Ingen v. Whitman, 62 N. Y. 513 (1875); Lineweaver 'V.
Slagle, 64 Md. 465, 2 Atl. 693 (1886); Strang v. Thomas 114 Wis. 599, 91
N. W. 237 (1902). It has been held, however, that in some circumstances
a creditor who has participated in the formation of a limited partnership
or has dealt with it as such may be estopped to set up any such dereliction
so as to hold special partners to general liability. Tracy v. Tuffly, 134
U. S. 206, 10 Sup. Ct. 527 (1889); Allegheny National Bank v. Bailey, 147
Pa. 111, 23 Atl. 439 (1892). And, of course, it is no defense to a person
sued by an alleged limited partnership that the special partner or partners
in the plaintiff firm may have acted in such a manner as to subject them-
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Such is indeed the express provisions of the Indiana statute; and
it may be assumed that the courts would impose this liability
with extreme strictness.
The Uniform Partnership Act is in this respect actually more
considerate of the interests of the creditors than the older statutes of which that of Indiana is a type. The provisions of the
certificate prescribed by the Uniform Act are much more elaborate and therefore more instructive to the creditors than those
of the Indiana Act. In the matter of publicity, the Uniform Act
has deleted the Indiana requirement of publication, though retaining the public recording. The requirement of publication is
in these days of very little benefit to the creditors since the probability of the publication coming to their notice is not very
great. The Indiana act requires filing in each county where the
partnership has an office 1 while the Uniform Act requires but
one filing. Here the Indiana rule seems to be somewhat desirable
and might perhaps be retained if the Uniform Act were adopted
in this state.
The provision of the Indiana statute in regard to renewal or
continuation of a limited partnership 16 is also quite troublesome.
The statute requires the making, recording and publishing of a
certificate in exactly the same manner as when the partnership
was originally formed, under penalty of general liability of special partners in case of a failure. The special partner is in difficulties from this, not only because of the stringent requirements
as to the mechanics of preparation of this certificate, but also
because in case of any impairment of capital he is likely to be
held as a general partner in that he has failed to contribute the
amount specified in the new certificate, and this notwithstanding
his ignorance of such impairment.' 7 The Uniform Act obviates
selves to the liability of general partners. Clement v. British American
Assurance Company, 141 Mass. 298, 5 N. E. 847 (1886).
15 If this is not done, the special partner is liable as a general partner
as to all business carried on by the office in the county where the certificate
is not recorded but that liability may not extend to business carried on by
the office in the county where it is recorded. See O'Connor v. Graff, 186
App. Div. 163, 173 N. Y. Supp. 730 (1919).
16 Burns', Sec. 12146.
17 This result was reached in Haddock v. Grinnell, 109 Pa. 372, 1 Atl.
174 (1885), and Durgin v. Colburn, 176 Mass. 710, 57 N. E. 213 (1900).
However, in Fifth Ave. Bank v. Colgate, 120 N. Y. 381, 24 N. E. 799 (1890),
the court reached the opposite result, on the theory that the New York
statute does not require any statement as to the condition of the capital in
a renewal certificate, and so any statement actually made could be ignored

LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS IN INDIANA

this difficulty by providing for continuation by mere amendment
of the certificate. Under such circumstances the partnership
simply continues in existence and possible impairment of capital
is not serious.
The next section of the Indiana statute' s with a section of the
1903 Act supplementing it 19 is concerned mainly with the powers
of the special partner. In general, he is forbidden to carry on
any partnership business or to attempt to bind the general partners ;20 but he is given the right to examine the books and to give
his advice to the general partners, advice which, however, they
are under only a moral obligation, if that much, to follow. 2 1 This
is, of course, a fundamental theory of limited partnerships; there
can be no possible reason for exempting a partner, who actually
participates in the business, from full liability. Such is, therefore, the provision of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act.
However, it is expressly provided in that act that such partners
may lend money to the partnership and may rank with the general creditors therefor; a power which they probably do not possess without express statutory authorization. 22 The imposition
of the liability of a general partner upon a special partner of
course carries with it the rights of a general partner, also ;23 but
this is generally cold comfort for the supposed special partner,
especially as the liability generally becomes important only after
the firm has become insolvent.
As to the next section of the statute, 24 forbidding any reduction of the capital stock of the partnership through withdrawals,
as surplusage. Obviously this New York rule is not applicable under the
Indiana statutes.
Is Burns', Sec. 12147.
19 Burns', Sec. 12154.
2U It follows that a special partner has no power to bind the firm.
Columbia Land and Cattle Co. v. Daly, 46 Kans. 504, 26 Pac. 1042 (1891).
21 Where a special partner appointed his son as his clerk and provides

in his agreement with the general partners that no expenditures could be
made without the son's approval, it was held that the special partner had
such control of the partnership business as to make him a general partner.
Richardson v. Hogg, supra, note 14.
22 Dunning's Appeal, 44 Pa. 150 (1863); Jaffe v. Krum, 88 Mo. 669
(1886). But in Clapp v. Lacey, 35 Conn. 436 (1868), the opposite result
was reached, under a somewhat different statute.
23 Hutehins v. Page, 204 Mass. 284, 90 N. E. 565 (1910).
But cf. Tilge
v. Brooks, 124 Pa. 178, 16 Atl. 746 (1889).
24 Burns', Sec. 12148. Sec. 12156, a part of the 1903 act, relates to the
same subject.
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much the same may be said. The liability which the Indiana act
imposes for a violation of this provision is not very severe-it is
only that the special partner must pay back such withdrawals.
Probably the customary'but more severe penalty of general liabilities would be imposed in case of a mere colorable compliance
with the statute as, for instance, the return to the special partner of all or part of his contribution under the guise of payment
for property, etc. 25 But this provision certainly cannot be seriously objected to.
The Indiana statute contains provisions with respect to assignment by a limited partnership to pay its debts. 26 This is not a
matter of consequence and is not specifically provided for in the
Uniform Act. It is probable that such an assignment if otherwise complying with the statute can be made by a limited as well
27
as by a special partner.
The Indiana act further provides that in case of suit by or
against a limited partnership only the general partners shall be
made parties except where the special partners have through
some dereliction subjected themselves to the liabilities of general
partners. 28 This would seem to indicate that a person who becomes liable as a general partner is in fact a general partnercontrary to certain decisions in other jurisdictions.29 The rule
would, however, appear to be clearly correct.
As already seen, formation and renewal of limited partnerships are very technical and highly dangerous in Indiana. Dissolution appears to be nearly as bad. The provision is that there
shall be no dissolution, except by operation of law, unless by
making, recording and publishing a certificate of dissolution in
the same manner and with the same formalities as the earlier
certificate.3 0 Here again is a troublesome and technical procedure which is not necessary under the Uniform Act. However,
the danger to the special partner is perhaps not so great as in
25Lineweaver v. Slagle, supra, note 14; Metropolitan Bank v. Sirret,

97 N. Y. 320 (1884), is difficult to reconcile with this doctrine, and seems
of doubtful soundness.

See also, Madison County Bank v. Gould, 5 Hill

(N. Y.) 309 (1843).
26 Burns', Secs. 12149-12150.
27 T.racy v. Tuffly, supra,note 14; Continental National Bank v. Strauss,
137 N. Y. 148, 32 N. E. 1066 (1893).

28 Burns', Sec. 12151.
29McKnight v. Ratcliff, 44 Pa. 156 (1863); Tilge v. Brooks, supra, note

23.
30 Burns', Sec. 12152.
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the other cases, since in the event of failure to dissolve properly,
the partnership continues, and the special partners remain special partners. Since the special partner has nothing to do with
carrying on the business, there would seem to be no necessity
that he should give notice to the creditors of the firm, whether
present or future.
The foregoing discussion has covered all the provisions of the
original Indiana act of 1859 which are still in force, together
with one or two sections of the 1903 act which are merely supplementary to the earlier statute. There are, however, a few
provisions of the more recent act which are worthy of separate
consideration. One of these, and one of distinctly liberalizing
tendency, is a provision that capital of limited partnerships may
be increased by taking in new partners or by new subscriptions
to capital by existing partners. 3 1 Thus increase is to be shown
by a certificate to be executed and recorded; but it is specifically
provided that a failure to carry out this provision shall not dissolve the partnership or subject the special partners to the liability of general partners. This provision shows a distinctly
modern trend away from the rigid and severe provisions of the
older statute. It is a step in the right direction but a very small
one. Other important provisions are that a special partner may
with the consent of his partners transfer his interest in the firm
without causing a dissolution of the partnership 32 and that the
insolvency of a special partner shall likewise not dissolve the
firm. 3 3 These provisions are in accordance with the growing
recognition of the fact that while a special partner is a partner
yet he is not in the confidential relationship to the general partners which would be the case in any ordinary firm.3 4 Thus it
has been held in New York that a special partner may engage in
a competing business without being guilty of bad faith toward
his general partners. 35 Such would seem to be the situation in
Indiana.
31 Burns', Sec. 12157.
32 Burns', Sec. 12158.
33 Burns', Sec. 12159.
34 The Uniform Partnership Act has similar provisions and also specifically provides that the death of a special partner shall not dissolve the partnership. But in any event, a person to be a special partner must be more
than a mere creditor of the firm. Richardson v. Carlton, 109 Ia. 515, 80
N. W. 532 (1899). However, a special partner under the Uniform Act is
hardly to be considered a partner at all.

3 Skolny v. Richter, 139 App. Div. 534, 124 N. Y. Supp. 152 (1910).
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As already stated, the purpose of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act was to get away from the rather savage penalty of
liability as a general partner imposed by most of the statutes
upon a special partner where there was the slightest defect in
the formation or conduct of the partnership-a defect of which
the special partner would often know nothing and which he could
not always control.36 Some of the liberalizing provisions of the
Uniform Act have already been referred to but thus far some of
the most fundamental of these provisions have not been touched
on. Of these the most important is unquestionably Section 11,
which provides: "A person who has contributed to the capitalof a business conducted by a person or partnership, erroneously
believing that he has become a limited partner in a limited partnership, is not, by reason of his exercise of the rights of a limited
partner, a general partner with the person or in the partnership
carrying on the business, or bound by the obligations of such
person or partnership; provided, that on ascertaining the mistake he promptly renounces his interest in the profits of the business, or other compensation by way of income."
This obviously means that so long as the special partner acts
in good faith and remedies any defects as soon as he learns of
them he will not be subjected to the liabilities of a general partner. In fact it has been held in Illinois that under this provision
special partners were not subject to the liabilities of a general
partner although the limited partnership was formed for purposes forbidden by the laws of the state to be carried on by a
limited partnership. " 7 The recent tendency has undoubtedly
been toward a more liberal construction of the old laws in the
interest of the special partner, 38 but obviously this single provision accomplishes more than any court could do through mere
construction. By protecting the special partners, it insures the
reasonable and proper use of the limited partnership when economically desirable-a result which is not and obviously cannot
be obtained under such a rigid statute as still governs in Indiana.
Another important provision of the Uniform Act is one by
which the same person may become both a general and a special
36 Another scheme which the Uniform Partnership Act introduces to
correct this situation is to restrict: somewhat the powers of the general partners as against the special partners.
37 Gilles v. Vette, 263 U. S. 553, 44 Sup. Ct. 157 (1924).
See comment
on the decision of the lower court in this case in 36 Harv. L. Rev. 1016.
38 See page 423, supra.
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partner in the firm. The result of this is that a person who is
a general and at the same time a special partner has all the
rights and powers, and is subject to all the liabilities, of a general partner, except that in regard to his contributions he has
the right against the other partners if he were not a partner.
There is also a provision which should have a very large effect
in the encouraging of the formation of limited partnerships,
since it enables persons desiring to do so, to be in the dual position of a general partner in so far as creditors are concerned
and a special partner in relation to their co-partners. 39
The situation in this state then seems to be as follows: Indiana has, and long has had, a limited partnership act of the conventional type. However, the act has been made little use of,
because the possibility of full liability was so serious as to make
it seem useless to attempt to carry on business in this manner.
In spite of a rather weak attempt to liberalize the act in the early
years of the present century that condition still exists, and it will
continue to exist until the menacing possibility of unlimited liability, already referred to, is removed. If Indiana desires, as it
seems it should desire, the reasonable use of limited partnerships
as business organizations in this state40 it should adopt the Uniform Limited Partnership Act which will have the effect of protecting all honest persons who desire to become limited partners
and will, therefore, make this type of partnership a safe as well
as a worth while business organization in this state.
39, See Lewis, supra, note 7, at pp. 725 ff.
4u Especially in view of the present uncertain position of business trusts

in this state. See III Ind. L. J. 318.

